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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of exchange rate movements on the conduct of monetary policy
in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. We develop and estimate a
structural general equilibrium two-sector model with sticky prices and wages and limited
exchange rate pass-through. Different speciﬁcations for the monetary policy rule and the real
exchange rate process are examined. The results indicate that the Reserve Bank of Australia, the
Bank of Canada and the Bank of England paid close attention to real exchange rate movements,
whereas the Reserve Bank of New Zealand did not seem to incorporate exchange rate movements
explicitly into their policy rule. With a higher degree of intrinsic inﬂation persistence, the central
bank of New Zealand seems less concerned about future inﬂation pressure induced by current
exchange rate movements. In addition, the structure of the shocks driving inﬂation and output
variations in New Zealand is such that it may be sufﬁcient for the Reserve Bank of New Zealand
to only respond to exchange rate movements indirectly through stabilizing inﬂation and output.
JEL classiﬁcation: F3, F4
Bank classiﬁcation: Exchange rates; Monetary policy framework; International topics
Résumé
L’auteure étudie l’incidence des mouvements du taux de change sur la conduite de la politique
monétaire en Australie, au Canada, en Nouvelle-Zélande et au Royaume-Uni. Elle élabore et
estime un modèle structurel d’équilibre général à deux secteurs dans lequel les prix et les salaires
sont rigides et les variations du taux de change se répercutent de façon limitée. L’auteure examine
différentes spéciﬁcations pour la règle de politique monétaire et l’équation de taux de change réel.
Les résultats indiquent que la Banque de réserve d’Australie, la Banque du Canada et la Banque
d’Angleterre prêtent une attention particulière aux mouvements du taux de change réel, alors que
la Banque de réserve de Nouvelle-Zélande ne semble pas les prendre en compte de manière
explicite dans sa règle de politique monétaire. Le degré de persistance intrinsèque de l’inﬂation
étant plus élevé en Nouvelle-Zélande, la banque centrale de ce pays est apparemment moins
préoccupée des pressions inﬂationnistes futures que pourraient induire les variations actuelles du
taux de change. En outre, la structure des chocs qui déterminent les ﬂuctuations de l’inﬂation et de
la production en Nouvelle-Zélande est telle qu’il sufﬁt peut-être à la banque centrale de réagir de
façon indirecte aux mouvements de change en stabilisant l’inﬂation et la production.
Classiﬁcation JEL : F3, F4
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Cadre de la politique monétaire; Questions internationales; Taux de
change1 Introduction
Taylor (2001) argues that a well-functioning monetary policy regime should be based on three elements:
a °exible exchange rate, an in°ation target and a monetary policy rule. This trinity, however, does
not imply that movements in the exchange rate can be ignored by the central bank: exchange rate
movements may cause relative prices to adjust, and therefore a®ect the demand for domestic goods. In
addition, monetary policy is partly transmitted to the real economy through its e®ect on the exchange
rate. The critical question is to what extent central banks take into account exchange rate movements
explicitly in formulating monetary policy.
There are two strands of literature on this issue. The ¯rst strand examines whether central banks
should respond to exchange rate movements. There is little consensus yet on this question. Ball (1999)
argues that exchange rate movements a®ect domestic in°ation through its e®ect on import prices, and
thus central banks should optimally react to exchange rate movements. Likewise, Svensson (2000)
argues that a °exible exchange rate permits the transmission of monetary policy through additional
channels, and since the exchange rate is a forward-looking variable, it improves monetary policy by
incorporating expectations of future variables. Conversely, some studies suggest that there should be
no role for the exchange rate in the optimal monetary policy rule. In a theoretical model, Clarida, Gali
and Gertler (2001) ¯nd that when there is complete exchange rate pass-through, central banks should
target domestic in°ation and ignore exchange rate movements. West (2004) suggests that exchange
rate stabilization may aggravate instability elsewhere.
The second strand in the literature estimates policy reaction functions to study the actual role of
exchange rates in the implementation of monetary policy. For developed economies, Clarida, Gali and
Gertler (1998) show that the monetary authorities in some European countries and Japan responded
to exchange rate misalignments. Along the same line, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) ¯nd that many
emerging economies use interest rates as the means of smoothing exchange rate °uctuations. A free
°oating exchange rate increases foreign exchange volatility, which may cause problems for the banking
system and induce balance-sheet e®ects. For this reason, countries may face \fear of °oating". In this
context, there is some controversy as to whether this response is optimal or not.
Rather than estimating monetary policy functions in a univariate setup as in the previous literature,
Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) study the role of exchange rates in monetary policy rules by estimating
a general equilibrium model, which allows for an endogenous transmission mechanism. They develop
a small open economy model with four endogenous equations and ¯ve exogenous shocks, and are the
¯rst to apply Bayesian estimation method to address the issue of open-economy monetary policy rules.
However, the real exchange rate in their model is assumed to be exogenously speci¯ed following an
autoregressive process. This is because if the terms of trade are speci¯ed endogenously, the estimation
of the fully structural model is problematic. Moreover, complete pass-through of exchange rates is
assumed, which leaves out a signi¯cant part of the story. With limited endogenous transmission, it
might be di±cult to o®er structural interpretations for the empirical results. And to be able to exploit
cross-equation restrictions and the links of the monetary policy rule with the rest of the economy, these
are essential.
1In this paper, we build upon Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) and adopt a multivariate approach
of estimating a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to examine the role of exchange rates
in monetary policy rules. We develop a small open economy two-sector model with several frictions
that generate limited exchange rate pass-through in the short run. In particular, we assume that
prices and wages are sticky following Calvo (1983), with partial indexation of prices and wages on
lagged in°ation. The non-tradable sector produces goods for consumption and investment, and provides
distribution services to facilitate the sale of foreign-produced imports. Also, we allow for a data-
determined combination of producer currency pricing (PCP) and local currency pricing (LCP) ¯rms
in the tradable sector. The currency of invoicing has an impact on the magnitude of the pass-through
e®ect, which may a®ect the desired exchange rate volatility. Our model is estimated using the Bayesian
method for di®erent speci¯cations of the monetary policy rule for four countries: Australia, Canada,
New Zealand and the United Kingdom.
One of the ¯ndings of this paper is that the endogenous real exchange rate speci¯cation leads to
much higher marginal likelihood values for all four countries than the exogenous real exchange rate
speci¯cation. The estimation results suggest that for the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Bank of
Canada and the Bank of England, the monetary policy rule incorporated an interest rate reaction to
real exchange rate movements, whereas the Reserve Bank of New Zealand did not seem to explicitly
include exchange rate movements in their policy rule, though the indirect e®ect of exchange rates on
interest rates exists.
Our empirical results suggest the following explanations for why New Zealand is di®erent. First, it
may be related to the structure of shocks in accounting for in°ation and output variations. Particularly,
for New Zealand, the technology shock in the non-tradable sector does not play a signi¯cant role for
in°ation variation, and the risk premium shock is unimportant in explaining the forecast error variances
of output. This di®ers from our results for Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom. The nature
of the shocks and their implications for monetary policy suggest that it may not be su±cient for
the central banks of Australia, Canada and the UK to respond to real exchange rate variation only
indirectly through targeting in°ation rate and stabilizing output levels. Second, the degree of partial
price indexation is estimated to be much larger for New Zealand, which suggests that current in°ation
depends more on past in°ation and less on expected future in°ation. Therefore, when the Reserve Bank
of New Zealand responds to current in°ation, it is less concerned about future in°ation pressure caused
by real exchange rate movements. We assess the robustness of the benchmark results to alternative
sample lengths and other speci¯cations of the monetary policy rule. The main results remain largely
unchanged.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model.
Section 3 describes the data and the empirical methodology to be employed. Section 4 states the main
empirical results. Section 5 reports ¯ndings from robustness analysis. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
22 The Model
The model in this paper is of a small open economy, in which the foreign output, prices and interest
rate are taken as exogenous. There are two sectors in the domestic economy: tradable and non-
tradable. Domestic intermediate good and non-tradable good producers use capital and labor as inputs
for production. Non-tradable distribution services are needed to bring foreign-produced intermediate
inputs to the domestic market. Competitive ¯nal good producers use composites of both domestic-
and foreign-produced di®erentiated intermediate goods to produce ¯nal goods for consumption and
investment. Several frictions are introduced, including Calvo-type sticky prices and wages with partial
indexation on lagged in°ation, a combination of both PCP and LCP ¯rms, cost of adjustment in
capital accumulation, and consumption habit formation. The structure of the model is similar to Dong
(2007), and shares its basic features with many recent dynamic general equilibrium models, including
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003). We refer to Dong (2007)
for more details of the model. In what follows, we simply discuss the solutions of the model.
2.1 Households
The estimation is based on the ¯rst order conditions characterizing households' utility and ¯rms'
pro¯t maximization problems. Households derive utility from the consumption of tradable and non-



















Here, ¼t is the gross consumption in°ation rate, Rt is the domestic interest rate, CT;t and CN;t denote
the aggregate consumption of tradable and non-tradable goods, and PT;t and PN;t represent the corre-
sponding prices. ½ is the coe±cient of relative risk aversion of households, ¯ is the subjective discount
factor, h is the habit formation coe±cient, and & is the elasticity of substitution between tradable and
non-tradable consumption goods.
Households provide labor services, LN;t, to non-tradable good producers, and LT;t to intermediate
tradable good producers, at the wage rate Wi
t. They also own capital and rent it to producers at the
rates rk
T;t and rk
N;t, for tradable sector and non-tradable sectors, respectively. Optimal wage setting and


















































(Ct ¡ hCt¡1)¡½ ; (2.7)
where Ãw captures the extent of wage stickiness, ¿w is the degree of wage indexation, ° is the elasticity
of substitution among di®erent types of labor services, and $i
t is the optimal wage rate for labor service
of type i at time t if household i is randomly selected to re-optimize in that period. Finally, ± is the
depreciation rate and Â represents size of adjustment cost.
Households can hold the domestic currency bond Bt, and the foreign currency bond B¤
t . The
foreign interest rate R¤














where St is the nominal exchange rate, de¯ned as the price of foreign currency in terms of domestic
currency, and ^ 't represents the risk premium shock, which is assumed to follow a ¯rst order autore-
gressive process. We assume the risk premium depends on not only the country's net foreign debt but
also the expected change in the exchange rate EtSt+1=St¡1, as in Adolfson et al. (2007), based on the









Or, alternatively, we can simply assume that the real exchange rate follows an exogenous autoregressive
process as in Lubik and Schorfheide (2007). We test the endogenous versus exogenous speci¯cations of
real exchange rates with the structural estimation.
2.2 Tradable Sector
Final goods are produced as CES aggregates of domestic intermediate inputs and imports. The
demand for each type of intermediate goods thus depends on their relative prices and the elasticity of
1It is used as a stationarity-inducing technique to ensure the existence of a unique steady state for the small open
economy. For other ways of inducing stationarity of the equilibrium dynamics for small open economy models, see
Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2003).
2Adolfson et al. (2007) show that a small open economy model with a modi¯ed speci¯cation of the risk premium better
matches the observed properties of Swedish data.













Intermediate tradable good producers use capital and labor as inputs, and act as monopolistic
competitors for price setting. In this paper, I assume that a proportion Á of intermediate ¯rms use
LCP for their export pricing, while (1¡Á) use PCP, where Á is a structural parameter to be estimated
later. Since the fraction of ¯rms employing LCP versus PCP will have an impact on the pass-through
e®ect of exchange rates to domestic prices, central banks may frame their policy in a way to take this




denote the prices set for the foreign market respectively by an LCP ¯rm and a PCP ¯rm. The ¯rst























































The price index for intermediate goods sold domestically, PH;t, and the export price index, P¤
H;t,






























+ (1 ¡ Ãd)
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where " represents the elasticity of substitution among varieties produced within one country. The












Similarly, non-tradable goods are also produced with capital and labor. Non-tradable goods are
used for consumption, investment, and distribution services to import foreign-produced intermediate















As in Burstein, Neves and Rebelo (2003), we assume that to bring one unit of the tradable intermediate
good to the domestic market, ¸ units of a basket of the di®erentiated non-tradable goods are needed.
Thus, the price index for foreign-produced intermediate goods in the home market, PF;t, and the trade
balance value are given by:
PF;t(s) = StP¤
t (s) + ¸PN;t (2.15)
TBt = PF;tYF;t ¡ StP¤
H;tY ¤
H;t: (2.16)
2.4 Government and Monetary Authority
The government balances its budget. Aggregate government spending is assumed to be an exoge-
nous process, with the shares on tradables and non-tradables depending on their relative prices.















The monetary policy reaction function is described as a Taylor (1993) rule. Central banks take
the domestic interest rate as the policy instrument to respond to the in°ation rate and the output gap.
ln(Rt=R) = ½r ln(Rt¡1=R) + (1 ¡ ½r)[®¼ ln(¼t=¼) + ®y ln(Yt=Y )] + ²rt; (i)
where ½r is a parameter capturing interest-rate smoothing, and ²rt is a temporary monetary policy
shock.3
3An alternative speci¯cation of the monetary policy reaction function is the in°ation forecast-based rule, where the
monetary authority adjusts the short-term interest rate based on the di®erence between expected in°ation in the future
6We are interested in investigating the role of exchange rates in the monetary policy rule, so we test
the hypothesis of rule (i), in which central banks do not respond directly to exchange rate movements,
against the following possible rules:
Nominal Exchange Rate Smoothing:
ln(Rt=R) = ½r ln(Rt¡1=R) + (1 ¡ ½r)[®¼ ln(¼t=¼) + ®y ln(Yt=Y ) + ®x ln(St=St¡1)] + ²rt (ii)
Real Exchange Rate Smoothing:
ln(Rt=R) = ½r ln(Rt¡1=R) + (1 ¡ ½r)[®¼ ln(¼t=¼) + ®y ln(Yt=Y ) + ®x ln(qt=qt¡1)] + ²rt (iii)
Risk Premium Smoothing:
ln(Rt=R) = ½r ln(Rt¡1=R) + (1 ¡ ½r)[®¼ ln(¼t=¼) + ®y ln(Yt=Y ) + ®x ln(rpt=rpt¡1)] + ²rt: (iv)
In rule (ii), in addition to reacting to the in°ation and output gap, central banks also include
nominal exchange rate movements in the policy rule, in order to reduce nominal exchange rate volatility.
In rule (iii), central banks respond to real exchange rate movements, instead of nominal exchange rate
movements. Considering that all four countries examined in this paper are fairly open economies, the
central bank may want to respond to real exchange rate movements in order to smooth international
relative price °uctuations that could a®ect their international competitiveness and have an e®ect on
aggregate demand for domestic goods. Finally, in rule (iv), in order to maintain ¯nancial stability,
central banks can react to risk premium shifts that re°ect changes in the expectations of risks in
¯nancial markets. We test each of these monetary policy rules within the structural framework by
estimating variants of the base model and evaluating the marginal likelihood values and posterior odds.
The model is analyzed in the log-linearized form around a non-stochastic steady state, which
yields a system of equations that are linear in log deviations and can be solved using standard methods.
The log-linearized equations are described in Appendix A.4 The debt-elastic risk premium assumption
ensures that the model has a steady state. The stochastic behavior of this model is driven by eight
exogenous shocks, and they are assumed to evolve according to AR(1) processes. For the small open
economy, all foreign variables are taken as exogenously determined:
and the in°ation target, and the output gap. These types of rules are often used in central banks' projection models. The
major critique of the Taylor rule is that it is not forward-looking. Nevertheless, the Taylor rule concisely captures some
of the key judgements that policymakers must confront, its performance is robust across various economic models, and it
generally ¯ts the data remarkably well. In addition, in the policy making process, central banks usually do not strictly
adhere to the suggested interest rate setting derived from projection models and may deviate from it temporarily if they
judge it necessary (Blinder, 1998). Thus the ex post interest rate path may be represented di®erently. In any case, we
check the robustness of the empirical ¯ndings to the alternative speci¯cation of expected in°ation targeting in Section 5.
4In this model, real variables are assumed to be stationary. The following transformations of variables are used to
achieve stationarity: pT;t = PT;t
Pt
, pN;t = PN;t
Pt
, pH;t = PH;t
Pt






























, xN;t = XN;t
Pt
, wt = Wt
Pt
, !t = $t
Pt
























t = (1 ¡ ½R¤)lnR¤ + ½R¤ lnR¤
t¡1 + ²R¤t
lnAT;t = (1 ¡ ½AT)lnAT + ½AT lnAT;t¡1 + ²ATt
lnAN;t = (1 ¡ ½AN)lnAN + ½AN lnAN;t¡1 + ²ANt
lnY ¤








l;t¡1) = (1 ¡ ½p¤)ln(¼¤








lnGt = (1 ¡ ½g)lnG + ½g lnGt¡1 + ²gt
ln ^ 't = (1 ¡ ½')ln ^ ' + ½' ln ^ 't¡1 + ²'t:
3 Empirical Approach
3.1 Data
The structural model is estimated using the Bayesian method. We use data on the following macroeco-
nomic series for the estimation: the real wage rate, output, real exchange rate, short term interest rate,
and the trade balance value over steady state exports.5 These variables help to capture the roles of
the exchange rate, trade, technology, prices and interest rate, as well as the explanatory factors arising
outside of the small open economy. The foreign variables for the domestic small open economy are
constructed as geometric weighted averages of the G-7 countries, excluding the domestic country under
consideration. The time-varying weights are based on each country's share of total real GDP.6
The model is taken to the data for four countries: Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United
Kingdom. The data are seasonally adjusted quarterly series, and are HP ¯ltered. The period covered
for our estimation is di®erent across countries due to their speci¯c histories. For Australia, our dataset
starts at 1984:1. This point is chosen because the Australian dollar was °oated in December 1983, most
exchange controls were abolished then, and ¯nancial system deregulation took place. Our dataset for
Canada covers the period 1970:1 to 2006:4, in light of its °oating exchange rate since 1970. The starting
point for New Zealand is 1985:2, when the ¯xed exchange rate with respect to a trade-weighted basket
of currencies was abolished. Major ¯nancial sector policy reforms were also carried out in 1984. The
case of the United Kingdom is more complicated due to the UK's membership in the Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System between 1990 and 1992. The United Kingdom
5Note that the information on prices has been captured in the real wage series.
6In addition, data on government consumption, foreign output, and foreign interest rates are collected and constructed





8¯nally left the ERM in 1992, which could be an appropriate starting point. However, the dataset might
be too short to deliver reliable estimation results. So in the benchmark case, we select 1979:3 as the
starting point, when an anti-in°ation policy was in place. For the sensitivity analysis, we re-estimate
the model for the UK over 1992:4 to 2006:4 to see if the results are robust to the choice of sample
period.
3.2 Bayesian Method
We estimate the structural model using Bayesian technique. The advantage of the system-based
approach is that it provides a consistent way to update researchers' beliefs about parameter values
based on the data that are actually observed. Priors on the parameters are assigned, based on results
from past studies and information outside the data set, to measure the ex ante plausibility of parameter
values. The time series are then brought in to revise the parameter values, based on information from
the data series, to get posterior estimates.7 The Bayesian approach also provides a framework to
compare and choose models on the basis of the marginal likelihood values. The marginal likelihood of





where µ represents the parameter vector and Y denotes the observable data series. p(µjM) is the prior
density of the parameters, and p(Y jµ;M) is the likelihood function. The marginal density indicates
the likelihood of the model given the data. As a Bayesian alternative to hypothesis testing, the Bayes





Let pi denote the prior probability assigned to model i, the posterior probability that model i is





The posterior odds is de¯ned as the ratio of the posterior probability that model i is plausible over the





The Bayes factor and the posterior odds are used to compare models in this paper, in order to test which
speci¯cation is more plausible in terms of the central banks' response to exchange rate movements.
7The model is estimated using a numerical optimization procedure provided by Dynare. Dynare is a collection
of MATLAB routines which study the transitory dynamics of non-linear models. More information can be found at:
http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare/.
9Probability statements about the parameters are made before observing the data. Since the es-
timation algorithm is computationally very intensive, some parameters are ¯xed by calibration. The
subjective discount factor ¯ is given a standard value of 0.99 for quarterly data. The relative risk
aversion parameter ½ is set to 4, and is consistent with the estimation results of Ambler, Dib and Rebei
(2003) based on Canadian data. The inverse of labor supply elasticity ¹ is set equal to 2. The weight
of tradable goods in the consumption basket, ®T, takes a value of 0.5. The elasticity of substitution
between tradables and non-tradables | &, is given a value of 0.6, which is selected based on the available
estimates.8 The elasticity of substitution among di®erent types of labor services ° is assumed to be 6,
consistent with micro estimates. The quarterly capital depreciation rate, ±, is set to 0.025.
For Canada, the share of capital in tradable good production, ´, is set to 0.37, and the share
of capital in non-tradable good production, µ, is set to 0.28. These calibrated values are based on
the estimation results of a two-sector small open economy model for Canada by Ortega and Rebei
(2006). For Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, the corresponding capital shares are
set to ´ = 0:36, µ = 0:32. The average fraction of labor e®ort in the tradable good sector, LT=L,
is inferred from the data on the distribution of civilian employment by economic sector for several
industrialized countries.9 A simple approximation of the service sector to represent the non-tradable
sector is used. The fraction LT=L is on average approximately 0.27 for Australia, 0.29 for Canada, 0.30
for New Zealand and 0.31 for the United Kingdom, during their respective estimation periods.
The priors for the structural parameters to be estimated are displayed along with the posterior
results. There are 25 parameters to be estimated, including parameters capturing the degree of price
stickiness and partial indexation, proportions of PCP versus LCP ¯rms, elasticities of substitution and
monetary policy rule coe±cients. For most of them, priors with wide standard deviations are used,
with means centered at values commonly regarded as reasonable. With respect to the priors for the
fraction of ¯rms employing LCP versus PCP for their exports, inferences are drawn from International
Merchandise Trade: Featured Article published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, survey results
for Canada from Murray, Powell, and La°eur (2003), as well as publications by the ECU Institute.10
Based on these, the prior means for Á and Á¤ are set at 0.73 and 0.31 for Australia, 0.76 and 0.3 for
Canada, 0.7 and 0.3 for New Zealand, and respectively 0.3, 0.4 for the UK.11
8Stockman and Tesar (1995) estimate the elasticity to be 0.44 for an \average" industrialized country out of the G7
countries. Mendoza (1991) estimates it to be 0.74.
9The time series data covering 1960-2006 is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics website.
10On average, the Australian dollar accounted for 27% of exports and 31% of imports from March quarter 2002 to March
quarter 2003. The survey results conducted by the Bank of Canada in 2002 show that 24% of Canadian ¯rms quote export
prices in Canadian dollars. The ECU institute reports that the percentages of exports and imports denominated in home
currency for the UK during the year of 1992 are 62% and 43%.
11Recent studies have debated whether exchange rate pass-through into import prices may have declined in recent years
in industrialized countries. The evidences are still mixed so far: Marazzi and Sheets (2007) document a sustained decline in
exchange rate pass-through to US import prices; Campa and Goldberg (2005), on the other hand, ¯nd that pass-through
declines were statistically signi¯cant only in 4 of the the 23 OECD countries they study and the United States is not
one of the four. Over time, the proportion of exports and imports invoiced in the domestic currency may change slightly.
However, as the International Merchandise trade article pointed out, in Australia's case, this was largely caused by changes
in exports or imports of a small number of commodities invoiced mainly in Australian dollars. In other words, the modest
movements of the invoice currency fractions are due to adjustments in export or import structure, rather than the invoice
currency switching by ¯rms. Overall, it seems reasonable to assume that the fractions Á and Á
¤ of ¯rms adopting LCP
are approximately constant.
10Priors on the policy coe±cients are chosen to match values generally associated with the Taylor
rule. The prior mean for the coe±cient on the lagged interest rate term ½r is set at 0.8, with a standard
deviation of 0.1. The coe±cient on the in°ation rate ®¼ is given a prior mean of 1.6. The prior mean
for the coe±cient on the output gap is set at 0.5. A large standard deviation of 0.2 is given, since the
empirical evidence on the value of this parameter is diverse. With respect to the coe±cient on exchange
rates or risk premium movements, whenever it is applicable, a prior mean of 0.25 is speci¯ed. For the
parameters of the shocks, little guidance is provided by the literature, so loose priors, which are not
very informative, are speci¯ed.
4 Empirical Results
In this section, we report the empirical results of our estimation. Speci¯cally, we ¯t various versions of
the structural model to the data and assess their empirical performance. We then compare the implied
marginal densities and discuss the parameter estimates. Finally, we present the impulse response and
variance decomposition results.
4.1 Model Assessment
We estimate the model under di®erent exchange rate and monetary policy reaction function speci¯ca-
tions. To assess the conformity of the model to the data, unconditional second moments are computed
and reported in Table 1-4 for the four countries in the benchmark case.12 The ¯rst block reports the
statistics of the data, and the second block presents the corresponding estimates implied by the model,
which are computed from 1,000 random draws in the posterior distributions of the structural parame-
ters. The median from the simulated distribution of moments are reported, together with the 10th and
90th percentiles.
As shown in the tables, in all cases, we see that the standard deviations and autocorrelations of
the observable series are very well matched with their counterparts derived from simulations of the
model. The data moments fall within the corresponding model con¯dence intervals. In particular, for
all countries, the persistence and excess volatility of real exchange rates and trade balances are well
captured by the simulated model. The model also provides generally good characterizations of the
cross correlation properties. In most cases, the data values lie within the error bands implied by the
model. The con¯dence intervals, however, are usually large, which implies that there is a large degree
of uncertainty about the model-based correlations. Overall, the model does a reasonably good job of
matching properties of the data, though there certainly may be room for improvement in the future.
12The benchmark model is the one where the real exchange rate is assumed to be endogenously determined and the
central bank includes real exchange rate movements in the monetary policy rule, in addition to in°ation and output gap.
114.2 Marginal Likelihood Values
The estimation results for the benchmark case are reported in Table 5-8 for Australia, Canada, New
Zealand and the United Kingdom. The parameter estimates for the absence of exchange rate response
case are also presented in Table 9 for New Zealand. For the sake of brevity, the parameter estimation
results for other cases are not reported, but the log marginal likelihood values are shown in Table
10. As can be seen from this table, the endogenous real exchange rate speci¯cation generally leads
to much larger marginal likelihood values than the exogenous real exchange rate speci¯cation.13 Since
Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) assume the real exchange rate to be exogenously given, their results could
potentially be biased.
Given that the endogenous qt speci¯cation leads to much higher marginal likelihood values, we
now turn to the comparison of di®erent forms of monetary policy rules with the real exchange rate
determined endogenously. We consider the four alternative monetary policy rules (i) { (iv) described
in Section 2. The central bank can potentially respond to nominal exchange rates °uctuations, real
exchange rates movements, or risk premium shifts, in addition to the in°ation rate and output gap.
We also estimate the model under the restriction ®x = 0, in which case central banks are assumed not
to respond to any exchange rate movement. The Bayes factors and posterior odds are computed and
presented in Table 11.
For Australia, the log marginal data density associated with ®x = 0 is larger than that of the
central bank responding to ¢st or ¢rpt case. But the marginal data density of the benchmark model
is 8.3343 larger on a log-scale than the ®x = 0 model.14 The values of Bayes factor and posterior odds
clearly show that the benchmark model is preferred when compared to the other models. This leads
us to favor the view that the Reserve Bank of Australia explicitly responded to real exchange rate
movements in the past two decades. For Canada, the marginal likelihood value of responding to ¢st
model is larger than that of the ®x = 0 model. The log marginal density of the benchmark model,
though, is still the largest among all of them, which seems to suggest that the Bank of Canada also paid
close attention to real exchange rate movements. The Bayes factor is at most 0.0043 for the other models
compared to the benchmark, and the posterior odds of the benchmark is around 231.56. The UK's
case is similar to Australia's case. The log marginal likelihood of the benchmark model is 1.8899 larger
on a log-scale than the absence of exchange rate response model. The benchmark model is preferred
over other models. Our estimation results suggest that the Bank of England directly responded to real
exchange rate movements over the sample period. The case for New Zealand, however, is di®erent. The
marginal data density is the largest for the absence of exchange rate response case. The Bayes factor
13It is worth noting that the numbers in Table 10 are log marginal likelihood values, so the di®erence between any two
marginal likelihood values is actually in the scale of the log di®erence to the power of e.
14We note that there is generally considerable di®erence in the marginal likelihood values associated with the central
banks reacting to real versus nominal exchange rate movements. This may seem puzzling at a ¯rst glance, since we know
real exchange rates move closely with nominal exchange rates. However, the transmission mechanism between interest
rates and real versus nominal exchange rates is di®erent. For example, in the extreme case where prices are fully °exible,
the nominal exchange rate appreciates or depreciates reacting to interest rate shifts. Nevertheless, the real exchange rate
won't react, because prices adjust right away to o®set whatever changes that might occur to the nominal exchange rate.
Thus the monetary policy response to the real versus nominal exchange rate movements would be very di®erent. Now
that in the model, the prices are not fully °exible, yet not completely ¯xed either, we should still see the di®erence in the
adjustment mechanism, only to a lesser degree.
12for ®x = 0 model is 8.4014 against the benchmark. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand did not seem to
explicitly include exchange rate variation into their policy rule over the past twenty years.
Our result on New Zealand is consistent with Huang, Margaritis and Mayes' (2001) ¯nding that
what appears to be a closed economy policy rule closely describes the actions of the Reserve Bank of
New Zealand for the period of 1989 to 1998. However, this should not be regarded as the Reserve Bank
of New Zealand paid no attention to exchange rate movements. Rather as pointed out by Taylor (2001),
although the monetary policy rule does not appear to involve an interest rate reaction to exchange rate
movements, it implies such a reaction through in°ation targeting and output stabilization.
4.3 Parameter Estimates
The posterior estimates are reported in Table 5-9. The ¯rst three columns in each table give an overview
of the prior distributions speci¯ed for the parameters. The next two columns present the estimated
posterior mode from directly maximizing the log of the posterior distributions, given the priors and
the likelihood based on the data. We also report the corresponding standard errors computed from
the inverse Hessian. The last three columns report the mean and the 90% con¯dence interval of the
posterior distributions obtained by using the Monte Carlo Metropolis Hastings algorithm. It is subject
to 1,000,000 draws, and the ¯rst 500,000 draws are dropped.
The Calvo stickiness parameters Ãd for domestic producer prices and Ãw for wage rates are es-
timated to be around 0.68 to 0.74 for all countries, which implies that, on average, prices and wages
are reset approximately once every three to four quarters. These estimated lengths of price and wage
contracts are in line with the macro literature. Lubik and Schorfheide (2006) report estimates of the
price stickiness parameter ranging from 0.74 to 0.78 in their two-country structural model. Ambler,
Dib, and Rebei (2003) estimate the Calvo adjustment parameter to be 0.68 for Canada. Microeconomic
evidence, however, tends to suggest less sticky prices. For all countries, prices are estimated to be less
sticky than wage rates.15
When ¯rms and households are not allowed to adjust prices and wage rates, they index the current
price levels by past in°ation. The parameters ¿d and ¿w capture the degree of this indexation. In the
benchmark case, they are estimated to be 0.27 and 0.33 for Australia , 0.28 and 0.24 for Canada, 0.25
and 0.15 for the UK. The corresponding estimates for New Zealand in the absence of exchange rate
response case are 0.47 and 0.30. The standard errors associated with these estimates are in similar scale
and in the neighborhood of 0.1. The estimated degree of price indexation for Australia, Canada and the
UK is close to 0.25, which corresponds to the weight on the lagged in°ation term to be about 0.2, and
the weight on the expected future in°ation term to be about 0.8 in the New Keynesian Phillips Curve.
For New Zealand, however, the estimated degree of price indexation is 0.47, which implies a weight of
0.32 on the lagged in°ation rate and 0.68 on the expected future in°ation rate. In the model, central
banks are assumed to respond directly to current in°ation. The fact that the current in°ation depends
less on the expected future in°ation in New Zealand may provide a case for the Reserve Bank of New
15As emphasized by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) , sticky wages play an important role in allowing the
model to generate reasonable price stickiness.
13Zealand to be less concerned about the future in°ation pressure induced by exchange rate movements.16
The proportions of domestic and foreign ¯rms using LCP to set export prices, Á and Á¤, are
estimated to be 0.78 and 0.29 for Australia, 0.81 and 0.25 for Canada, 0.74 and 0.24 for New Zealand,
and 0.34 and 0.24 for the United Kingdom. For the ¯rst three countries, LCP is dominant for its own
exports, but PCP is dominant for other countries' exports to them. While for the UK, in either case,
invoicing in the producers' currency is more frequent. The elasticity of substitution between domestic
and foreign varieties in the domestic market and in the foreign market, ¾ and ¾f, are estimated to be
around 1.4 to 2.0, which are in the upper half of the range of macro estimates. The distribution margin
% measures the fraction of the import price accounted for by distribution costs.17 It is estimated to
be 0.72 for Australia, 0.56 for Canada, 0.59 for New Zealand, and much larger at 0.82 for the UK.
Berger et al. (2007) analyze retail prices and at-the-dock prices of speci¯c items in the Bureau of Labor
Statistics' CPI and IPP databases and ¯nd the overall distribution margin for the United States to be
around 50% to 70%, which is much larger than people generally expected.
A slightly larger fraction of ¯rms exporting to Australia, Canada or New Zealand price their prod-
ucts in the local market currency, compared to the UK. This may suggest a slightly larger expenditure-
switching e®ect in the UK, when prices are sticky in the short run. However, as emphasized by Dong
(2007), the higher % is, the smaller the e®ect of exchange rate movements on the relative quantities.
As distribution costs account for a very large share in import prices in the UK, expenditure switching
over tradable goods would be much less signi¯cant. Krugman (1989) noted that exchange rate volatil-
ity might be emphasized, if the expenditure-switching e®ect is small. Based on this reasoning, if the
expenditure-switching e®ect were taken into account, the Bank of England might bene¯t from higher
exchange rate volatility. A welfare analysis can potentially provide a more thorough interpretation
on this, but it is beyond the focus of this paper. Of the four countries examined, Canada and New
Zealand are more open than Australia and the UK.18 Not surprisingly, our results suggest that the
degree of pass-through to consumption prices is larger for Canada and New Zealand than for the other
two countries. In Canada and New Zealand, the nominal exchange rate might provide less additional
information for monetary policy, since a certain part of the information is already contained in the
domestic prices. The real exchange rate provides extra information on the foreign price level though.
Turning to the estimates of the coe±cients in the monetary policy reaction functions, we ¯nd the
interest rate to be quite persistent for all countries. All four countries respond quite aggressively to the
output gap. For Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, the estimated coe±cients on real exchange
rate movements are signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. The estimates of the risk premium coe±cients, the
AR parameters and standard deviations for the unobserved shocks are also reported. It is worth noting
that the estimated exogenous processes for these shocks di®er signi¯cantly, though the same priors are
given at the beginning.
16Robustness analysis is performed in Section 5 with respect to expected in°ation targeting rules. For New Zealand,
they lead to worse model ¯t than current in°ation targeting rules in all cases.
17The distribution margin is de¯ned as in: ^ pF;t=(1-%)^ qt+%^ pN;t.
18The measure of openness data can be found at the Penn World Table database.
144.4 Impulse Responses
To further understand the dynamics of the model, impulse responses for Canada in the benchmark
case are presented in Figure 1-2. In the ¯gures, the impulse responses of four variables of interest to
eight exogenous shocks are displayed. The four variables are output, the real exchange rate, in°ation
rate and interest rate. The impulse responses show the consequences of a one-unit increase in the
exogenous shock for the value of variables. The responses are calculated from a random selection of
1,000 parameters out of the 500,000 draws from the posterior distributions. Together with the median
response, the 10% and 90% percentiles are also shown.
As can be seen from the ¯gures, a technology shock in the non-tradable sector drives up the
aggregate domestic output. The domestic currency depreciates. Final good producers then switch from
imports to domestically-produced goods. The positive technology shock increases the supply of goods,
and therefore lowers in°ation. Easing monetary policy in this case would further depreciate the domestic
currency. Similarly, a technology shock in the tradable sector also induces a drop in in°ation. But since
a technology shock in the tradable sector increases the production of domestic-produced intermediate
goods, the domestic currency appreciates. The central bank relaxing monetary policy contributes to
the expansionary e®ect on output.
A risk premium shock drives up the demand for foreign currency. The demand for domestic
currency declines, and the domestic currency depreciates. Monetary policy is tightened to constrain
in°ation, and aggregate output falls. A positive monetary policy shock means an increase in the
domestic interest rate. Domestic bonds become more attractive compared to foreign bonds, so the
domestic currency appreciates and the real exchange rate falls. In reaction to a government spending
shock, the domestic production is driven up by demand, which increases the demand for domestic
money. This puts upward pressure on the domestic interest rate. As a result, the domestic currency
appreciates.
The foreign shocks have signi¯cant impacts on the small open economy. An increase in foreign
prices leads to expenditure switching from foreign-produced goods to domestic-produced goods in both
domestic and foreign markets. This implies an increasing demand of the domestic currency, and the
domestic currency appreciates. The foreign in°ation is passed through to the domestic economy. In
response, the interest rate increases. Unsurprisingly, the e®ects of the foreign interest rate shock on
the key variables are in line with those of the risk premium shock. The two shocks are identi¯ed in the
model through the observed foreign interest rate series. In other words, the risk premium shock captures
whatever is left unaccounted for by the observed foreign interest rate shock. Finally, responding to a
foreign output shock, the demand for domestic exports increases, hence the aggregate domestic output
rises. The foreign output shock suggests an ease on domestic in°ation, and thus a looser monetary
policy.
154.5 Variance Decomposition
To infer the role of various structural shocks in driving the movements of output, the real exchange
rate, in°ation and interest rates, we present the variance decomposition results for various horizons in
Table 12-15 for the preferred models. Not surprisingly, we ¯nd that the foreign price shock plays an
important role in accounting for the forecast error variances of the real exchange rate, since all the
four countries considered here are small open economies. The technology shock in the tradable sector
is generally also very important in generating variations of the key variables. When we compare the
variance decomposition results for New Zealand with those for the other three countries, however, we
¯nd that they are very di®erent.
First, for Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, in addition to the foreign price shock,
the technology shocks in both tradable and non-tradable sector account for signi¯cant percentages
of in°ation variation; for New Zealand, the role of the technology shock in the non-tradable sector,
AN;t, is not important. As can be seen from the impulse response ¯gures and the earlier analysis, a
positive AN;t shock causes the domestic currency to depreciate. Meanwhile the positive technology
shock induces a drop in the in°ation rate. In this case, without an active monetary policy, expenditure
switching occurs from foreign- to domestic-produced intermediate goods due to the domestic currency
depreciation, and all the key variables then converge to their steady state values. However, if the central
bank were to respond to lower in°ation without consideration on exchange rate movements, the interest
rate would be reduced. This would induce a further depreciation of the domestic currency as a result,
and the magnitude of the adjustment increases. Since ampli¯ed volatility in the adjustment process
is undesirable, the central banks of Australia, Canada and the UK might want to directly react to
exchange rate movements in addition to in°ation targeting. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand, on the
other hand, simply has little of this concern.
Second, for New Zealand, 99% of the forecast error variances of the output are explained by
the tradable sector technology shock, AT;t, and the foreign price shock; for the other three countries,
in addition to those, the risk premium shock is as important as the AT;t shock, if not more. The
implications of the risk premium shock, the monetary policy shock, and the foreign interest rate shock
are quite di®erent from those of other shocks. In particular, they have no direct e®ect on the demand for
domestic-produced goods. Rather, they only work through their e®ects on exchange rates. In response
to a positive risk premium shock, the domestic currency depreciates. Final good producers tend to
substitute domestic-produced for foreign-produced goods. The demand for domestic money rises and
in°ation picks up. The interest rate is increased to contain in°ation, and output drops. For Australia,
Canada and the United Kingdom, direct response to exchange rate movements helps to reduce the
impacts of the risk premium shock. For New Zealand, this is not so relevant.19
19Since New Zealand is a much smaller country in economic scale compared to other countries studied in this paper,
it also seems plausible that its exchange rate might experience additional volatility due to some micro factors; while the
implementation of monetary policy is based on macro judgements. Accounting for the micro level shocks is beyond the
scope of this paper.
165 Robustness Checks
In this section, we assess the sensitivity of the estimation results to alternative data samples and in°ation
targeting rules. We ¯nd that changing data sample does not change the major empirical results. For
Australia and Canada, the expected in°ation targeting rule leads to better model ¯t. The results still
suggest that the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Bank of Canada and the Bank of England explicitly
reacted to real exchange rate movements and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand did not. For all the
countries, the models with sectoral in°ation targeting or wage in°ation targeting rules, however, are
inferior to models with current in°ation targeting rules, as they lead to lower log marginal likelihood
values.
5.1 Alternative Sample for the UK
As mentioned in Section 3, for the main estimation, we choose a starting point for the UK data series at
1979:3. However, over the 1990s, the Bank of England was committed to various degrees to the ERM,
and between October 1990 and September 1992, belonged to the \hard" ERM. Since this might a®ect
the estimation of the monetary policy reaction function, we use the post-ERM data for the United
Kingdom, starting from 1992:4 to 2006:4, to re-estimate the models. The log marginal likelihood values
corresponding to various speci¯cations of monetary policy rule are shown in Table 16, and the parameter
estimation results in the benchmark case are presented in Table 17.
All the major results stay the same. The marginal data density of the model, where the central
bank directly responds to real exchange rate variation, is the largest. The parameter estimation results
also remain essentially similar to the original estimates based on the longer data series. One exception
is that the estimate of the degree of price indexation ¿d is 0.47, much larger than its original estimate of
0.25. This in principle could imply that during 1992:4 to 2006:4, the current in°ation level depends less
on expected future in°ation and more on lagged in°ation in the UK. However, the estimation results
still suggest that the Bank of England explicitly included real exchange rate movements in its monetary
policy rule. As we state in Section 4, the structure of shocks in accounting for in°ation and output
variances may help to explain this ¯nding.
5.2 Expected In°ation Targeting
Our next robustness check is with respect to the possibility of expected in°ation targeting in the
monetary policy rules. Central banks are frequently generating forecasts for the economy and they are
aware of policy lags. Therefore it seems that an expected in°ation targeting rule is a closer description
of central banks' real practices. In this section, we re-estimate the models under the assumption that
central banks target the expected future in°ation rather than the current in°ation. The new monetary
policy rules can be speci¯ed as:
ln(Rt=R) = ½r ln(Rt¡1=R) + (1 ¡ ½r)[®¼Et ln(¼t+1=¼) + ®y ln(Yt=Y )] + ²rt
17ln(Rt=R) = ½r ln(Rt¡1=R) + (1 ¡ ½r)[®¼Et ln(¼t+1=¼) + ®y ln(Yt=Y ) + ®x ln(St=St¡1)] + ²rt
ln(Rt=R) = ½r ln(Rt¡1=R) + (1 ¡ ½r)[®¼Et ln(¼t+1=¼) + ®y ln(Yt=Y ) + ®x ln(qt=qt¡1)] + ²rt
ln(Rt=R) = ½r ln(Rt¡1=R) + (1 ¡ ½r)[®¼Et ln(¼t+1=¼) + ®y ln(Yt=Y ) + ®x ln(rpt=rpt¡1)] + ²rt:
The log marginal densities from these estimations are displayed in Table 18. Comparing these
values to those in the baseline cases, we see that the expected in°ation targeting assumption leads
to slightly larger marginal likelihood values in all cases for Australia and Canada. It suggests that
it is more likely that the Reserve Bank of Australia and the Bank of Canada followed an expected
in°ation targeting rule. For both countries, the central bank responding to ¢qt model is still preferred
among all the models. The estimates of ®¼, ®y and ®x in the expected in°ation targeting model are
slightly smaller than the corresponding estimates in the baseline case, which suggests that the central
banks of Australia and Canada may respond less aggressively to the in°ation rate, output gap and real
exchange rate movements than what the benchmark case indicates. For the UK, under certain policy
rule speci¯cations, expected in°ation targeting leads to better ¯t, while under other speci¯cations, it
results in worse ¯t. Overall, the highest marginal likelihood value is achieved for the model, where the
central bank responds to the current in°ation, output gap and real exchange rate movements. Finally,
for New Zealand, expected in°ation targeting rules result in worse model ¯t in all cases than current
in°ation targeting rules. The estimates of the policy response coe±cients are very similar to those in
the baseline case.
5.3 Sectoral In°ation Targeting
The next robustness check explores sectoral in°ation targeting, since the monetary authority may want
to respond di®erently to in°ation in the tradable sector, relative to in°ation in the non-tradable sector.
Speci¯cally, we re-estimate the structural model for the four countries with each one of the following
monetary policy rules:
ln(Rt=R) = ½r ln(Rt¡1=R) + (1 ¡ ½r)[®T ln(¼T
t =¼T) + ®N ln(¼N
t =¼N) + ®y ln(Yt=Y )] + ²rt
ln(Rt=R) = ½r ln(Rt¡1=R)+(1¡½r)[®T ln(¼T
t =¼T)+®N ln(¼N
t =¼N)+®y ln(Yt=Y )+®x ln(St=St¡1)]+²rt
ln(Rt=R) = ½r ln(Rt¡1=R)+(1¡½r)[®T ln(¼T
t =¼T)+®N ln(¼N
t =¼N)+®y ln(Yt=Y )+®x ln(qt=qt¡1)]+²rt
ln(Rt=R) = ½r ln(Rt¡1=R)+(1¡½r)[®T ln(¼T
t =¼T)+®N ln(¼N
t =¼N)+®y ln(Yt=Y )+®x ln(rpt=rpt¡1)]+²rt:
18Our estimation results are displayed in Table 19. For all countries, the assumption of sectoral
in°ation targeting worsens model ¯t, compared to the benchmark CPI in°ation targeting case.20 The
estimates on ®T and ®N are generally quite similar to each other, and are larger than the estimates of
®¼ in the baseline model. Benigno (2004) investigates how monetary policy should be conducted in a
two-region model, and shows that the near-optimal policy is to give higher weight to the in°ation in
the region where there is higher degree of price rigidity. Ortega and Rebei (2006) analyze the welfare
implications of sectoral in°ation targeting rule in the context of a small open economy model for Canada.
They ¯nd welfare gains in targeting exclusively the non-tradable good in°ation, since prices are more
sticky in the non-tradable sector. We do not ¯nd evidence supporting that, in practice, the central
banks studied in this paper responded very di®erently to the in°ation rates in di®erent sectors.21
5.4 Wage In°ation Targeting
Recent studies ¯nd that the optimal monetary policy may entail targeting wage in°ation when the
degree of nominal inertia di®ers between prices and wages. For example, Erceg and Levin (2006) show
that the optimal monetary policy rule can be closely approximated by a rule that targets a weighted
average of wage and price in°ation in the context of a two-sector general equilibrium model calibrated
to match the corresponding responses from an empirical VAR. Ortega and Rebei (2006), however,
¯nd that wage in°ation stabilization substantially increases almost all volatilities, and cannot improve
welfare over CPI in°ation targeting. In this section, we carry out our last sensitivity analysis with
respect to the following hybrid rules, to see whether in actual practice the central banks responded to
wage in°ation.
ln(Rt=R) = ½r ln(Rt¡1=R) + (1 ¡ ½r)[®¼ ln(¼t=¼) + ®w ln(¼W
t =¼W) + ®y ln(Yt=Y )] + ²rt
ln(Rt=R) = ½r ln(Rt¡1=R)+(1¡½r)[®¼ ln(¼t=¼)+®w ln(¼W
t =¼W)+®y ln(Yt=Y )+®x ln(St=St¡1)]+²rt
ln(Rt=R) = ½r ln(Rt¡1=R)+(1¡½r)[®¼ ln(¼t=¼)+®w ln(¼W
t =¼W)+®y ln(Yt=Y )+®x ln(qt=qt¡1)]+²rt
ln(Rt=R) = ½r ln(Rt¡1=R)+(1¡½r)[®¼ ln(¼t=¼)+®w ln(¼W
t =¼W)+®y ln(Yt=Y )+®x ln(rpt=rpt¡1)]+²rt:
The marginal likelihood values derived from the estimations are shown in Table 20. In almost all
cases, a combination of price and wage in°ation targeting leads to lower marginal densities than in the
CPI in°ation targeting case. The only exception is the central bank responding to ¢st rule for the UK,
in which case the marginal likelihood value associated with the hybrid rule is 2.3611 larger in log scale
20We also check the monetary policy rule speci¯cation of further breaking down the in°ation rates to the intermediate
tradable sector, the import sector and the non-tradable sector. The model ¯t is even worse in that case.
21It is worth noting that, in this paper, although the Calvo stickiness parameter Ãd is assumed to be the same for the
intermediate tradable good producers and the non-tradable good producers, the degree of price stickiness for ¯nal goods
and for non-tradable goods are di®erent. This is because the ¯nal goods are assumed to be composites of both domestically
produced intermediate goods and imports.
19than with the CPI in°ation targeting rule. Overall, however, for the UK, the marginal density is still
the largest for the model with the speci¯cation of the central bank responding to the CPI in°ation,
output gap and real exchange rate movements. The estimation results here do not seem to support
that these central banks included wage in°ation targeting into their monetary policy rules.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop and estimate a structural model with limited exchange rate pass-through
for Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, to study whether and how exchange
rate movements were incorporated in the formulation of monetary policy. Our main ¯nding is that
the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Bank of Canada and the Bank of England directly responded to
real exchange rate movements in the past, while the Reserve Bank of New Zealand did not seem to
incorporate exchange rate movements explicitly into their monetary policy rule. This, however, does
not imply that the Reserve Bank of New Zealand paid no attention to the exchange rate. Instead, the
central bank of New Zealand responded to exchange rate movements indirectly, because in our model,
the exchange rate, in°ation and output are all endogenously determined. What might appear to be
a closed economy rule actually implies an interest rate reaction to exchange rate movements through
in°ation and output stabilization.
Our results also reveal the potential explanations for the indirect reaction of the central bank of
New Zealand as follows. First, the structure of shocks accounting for in°ation and output variations
is di®erent for New Zealand than for the other three countries. In particular, in Australia, Canada
and the UK, the technology shock in the non-tradable sector is important in explaining the forecast
error variances of in°ation, and the risk premium shock plays a role in driving output variation. Since
the central bank solely responding to in°ation shifts driven by the non-tradable technology shock
would amplify volatilities in the adjustment path, and the risk premium shock only has impacts on the
domestic economy through exchange rate movements, the central banks of Australia, Canada and the
UK might want to respond to real exchange rate variation directly, although this is not of concern for
New Zealand. Second, in New Zealand, current in°ation seems to re°ect less expected future in°ation,
and contains more information on past in°ation. So the central bank of New Zealand might be less
concerned about future in°ation pressure caused by current exchange rate movements.
Our paper contributes to the literature of open economy monetary policy rules by extending Lubik
and Schorfheide (2007) to allow for endogenous exchange rate speci¯cation and to accommodate limited
exchange rate pass-through. We adopt a full-information approach to study the conduct of monetary
policy and deliver insights into the monetary transmission mechanism in open economies. In any case,
whether the central banks' responses are optimal or not is a di®erent question, and further research is
needed to address that.
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PR¤rp
(^ qt +^ b¤
t ¡ ^ r¤
t ¡ ^ rpt)
= d^ dt +
WL
P
( ^ wt + ^ lt) +
SB¤
P
(^ qt +^ b¤










N;t + ^ kN;t¡1 + ^ pN;t)
where:





(^ qt + ^ p¤




(^ pF;t + ^ yF;t) ¡
WL
P









N;t + ^ kN;t¡1 + ^ pN;t)
Trade balance value:
^ tbt = ^ pF;t ¡ ^ qt ¡ ^ p¤
H;t + ^ yF;t ¡ ^ y¤
H;t
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24Table 1: Unconditional Second Moments: Australia (Benchmark Case)
Australia
Variables Std Deviation Autocorrelation Correlation Correlation Correlation
with ^ yt with ^ qt with ^ tbt
Data
^ wt 0.0106 0.7156 -0.1416 0.0711 0.2066
^ yt 0.0111 0.7852 1.0000 -0.1471 0.3462
^ qt 0.0748 0.8349 -0.1471 1.0000 -0.3984
^ rt 0.0041 0.8182 0.4692 -0.0561 0.1879
^ tbt 0.1216 0.7959 0.3462 -0.3984 1.0000
Model
^ wt 0.0264 0.9127 0.4577 -0.3936 0.1794
(0.0179, 0.0405) (0.7731, 0.9865) (0.2156, 0.6572) (-0.6566, -0.0855) (-0.0957, 0.4401)
^ yt 0.0155 0.7386 1.0000 -0.3703 0.3039
(0.0125, 0.0194) (0.6063, 0.8439) (-0.6088, -0.1152) (0.0461, 0.5366)
^ qt 0.0764 0.8667 -0.3703 1.0000 -0.4988
(0.0601, 0.0984) (0.7628, 0.9334) (-0.6088, -0.1152) (-0.6945, -0.2153)
^ rt 0.0122 0.9523 -0.4760 0.4050 -0.0874
(0.0075, 0.0193) (0.8111,1.0000) (-0.6574, -0.2793) (0.1078, 0.6440) (-0.3609, 0.1814)
^ tbt 0.1243 0.8242 0.3039 -0.4988 1.0000
(0.0979, 0.1584) (0.7055, 0.9059) (0.0461, 0.5366) (-0.6945, -0.2153)
25Table 2: Unconditional Second Moments: Canada (Benchmark Case)
Canada
Variables Std Deviation Autocorrelation Correlation Correlation Correlation
with ^ yt with ^ qt with ^ tbt
Data
^ wt 0.0109 0.7987 -0.3104 -0.0016 -0.0361
^ yt 0.0142 0.8578 1.0000 0.2099 -0.0870
^ qt 0.0314 0.8428 0.2099 1.0000 0.1868
^ rt 0.0039 0.8131 0.5087 -0.0884 -0.1493
^ tbt 0.0442 0.5975 -0.0870 0.1868 1.0000
Model
^ wt 0.0169 0.8593 0.2732 -0.5547 0.0342
(0.0116, 0.0267) (0.6462, 0.9916) (-0.1132, 0.6017) (-0.8106, -0.1396) (-0.3155, 0.3509)
^ yt 0.0136 0.7199 1.0000 -0.1143 0.1370
(0.0105, 0.0172) (0.5219, 0.8653) (-0.4891, 0.2875) (-0.2156, 0.4474)
^ qt 0.0381 0.8657 -0.1143 1.0000 -0.0524
(0.0268, 0.0553) (0.6650, 0.9843) (-0.4891, 0.2875) (-0.3822, 0.3003)
^ rt 0.0086 0.9008 -0.3287 0.5279 0.0200
(0.0051, 0.0151) (0.6656, 1.0000) (-0.5991, 0.0280) (0.0507, 0.8234) (-0.3242, 0.3683)
^ tbt 0.0556 0.7219 0.1370 -0.0524 1.0000
(0.0432, 0.0703) (0.5202, 0.8492) (-0.2156, 0.4474) (-0.3822, 0.3003)
26Table 3: Unconditional Second Moments: New Zealand (Benchmark Case)
New Zealand
Variables Std Deviation Autocorrelation Correlation Correlation Correlation
with ^ yt with ^ qt with ^ tbt
Data
^ wt 0.0129 0.6948 0.0413 -0.1959 -0.0877
^ yt 0.0169 0.8117 1.0000 -0.6145 0.0569
^ qt 0.0893 0.8720 -0.6145 1.0000 -0.2713
^ rt 0.0037 0.6647 0.2056 -0.3512 0.1140
^ tbt 0.0909 0.4679 0.0569 -0.2713 1.0000
Model
^ wt 0.0361 0.9336 0.5846 -0.5076 0.1794
(0.0245, 0.0528) (0.8053, 0.9983) (0.3593, 0.7472) (-0.7299, -0.1946) (-0.0740, 0.3961)
^ yt 0.0238 0.7809 1.0000 -0.4857 0.2269
(0.0191, 0.0297) (0.6586, 0.8765) (-0.6812, -0.1899) (-0.0349, 0.4678)
^ qt 0.0964 0.9060 -0.4857 1.0000 -0.2391
(0.0725, 0.1275) (0.7955, 0.9703) (-0.6812, -0.1899) (-0.4742, 0.0420)
^ rt 0.0115 0.9387 -0.5612 0.2064 -0.0606
(0.0079, 0.0175) (0.7990, 1.0000) (-0.7148, -0.3610) (-0.1682, 0.5370) (-0.2916, 0.1608)
^ tbt 0.1318 0.7055 0.2269 -0.2391 1.0000
(0.1083, 0.1655) (0.5845, 0.8128) (-0.0349, 0.4678) (-0.4742, 0.0420)
27Table 4: Unconditional Second Moments: United Kingdom (Benchmark Case)
United Kingdom
Variables Std Deviation Autocorrelation Correlation Correlation Correlation
with ^ yt with ^ qt with ^ tbt
Data
^ wt 0.0083 0.7545 0.1810 -0.1294 0.1466
^ yt 0.0121 0.8672 1.0000 0.0172 0.4606
^ qt 0.0706 0.8079 0.0172 1.0000 -0.0495
^ rt 0.0032 0.8200 0.2384 -0.1496 0.1534
^ tbt 0.0395 0.6282 0.4606 -0.0495 1.0000
Model
^ wt 0.0310 0.9546 0.5088 -0.7108 0.0158
(0.0209, 0.0474) (0.8320, 1.0000) (0.2311, 0.7200) (-0.8614, -0.4598) (-0.2243, 0.2453)
^ yt 0.0137 0.7841 1.0000 -0.3100 0.1555
(0.0111, 0.0169) (0.6705, 0.8676) (-0.5855, -0.0389) (-0.0921, 0.3671)
^ qt 0.0928 0.8974 -0.3100 1.0000 -0.1024
(0.0687, 0.1255) (0.7869, 0.9645) (-0.5855, -0.0389) (-0.3371, 0.1439)
^ rt 0.0104 0.9650 -0.4917 0.6971 -0.0048
(0.0067, 0.0160) (0.8440, 1.0000) (-0.6924, -0.2687) (0.4179, 0.8592) (-0.2392, 0.2281)
^ tbt 0.0641 0.8166 0.1555 -0.1024 1.0000
(0.0509, 0.0813) (0.7153, 0.8965) (-0.0921, 0.3671) (-0.3371, 0.1439)
28Table 5: Parameter Estimates: Australia (Benchmark Case)
Australia
Prior Distribution Posterior Maximization Posterior Distribution
Parameters Distribution Mean Std Mode Std Error Mean 10% 90%
Ãd Beta 0.70 0.10 0.6832 0.0399 0.6893 0.6261 0.7533
Ãw Beta 0.70 0.10 0.7361 0.0455 0.7361 0.6655 0.8092
¿d Beta 0.50 0.15 0.2730 0.0815 0.2936 0.1633 0.4236
¿w Beta 0.50 0.15 0.3270 0.0963 0.3333 0.1845 0.4829
Á Beta 0.73 0.10 0.7755 0.0987 0.7482 0.5998 0.9044
Á
¤ Beta 0.31 0.10 0.2883 0.0978 0.2995 0.1489 0.4437
¾ Gamma 1.50 0.25 1.5082 0.2552 1.5745 1.1385 1.9942
¾f Gamma 1.50 0.25 2.0388 0.1849 2.0478 1.7416 2.3396
½r Beta 0.80 0.10 0.9270 0.0122 0.9274 0.9080 0.9472
®¼ Gamma 1.60 0.10 1.3992 0.0911 1.4118 1.2596 1.5589
®y Gamma 0.50 0.20 1.2094 0.2447 1.2678 0.8629 1.6764
®x Gamma 0.25 0.10 0.3414 0.0844 0.3501 0.2067 0.4853
's Gamma 0.45 0.20 0.3322 0.0454 0.3409 0.2733 0.4115
'n Gamma 0.01 0.005 0.0211 0.0047 0.0222 0.0146 0.0301
Â Gamma 10.0 2.00 14.742 2.2565 15.134 11.352 18.637
% Beta 0.40 0.10 0.7224 0.0525 0.7071 0.6252 0.7987
½p Beta 0.80 0.10 0.5386 0.0913 0.5517 0.4072 0.6899
½AT Beta 0.85 0.05 0.9664 0.0120 0.9605 0.9401 0.9823
½AN Beta 0.80 0.10 0.2967 0.0660 0.2930 0.1882 0.3982
½' Beta 0.80 0.10 0.8110 0.0714 0.8007 0.6901 0.9172
¾p Inv Gamma 0.01 4.00 0.0836 0.0178 0.0848 0.0562 0.1110
¾r Inv Gamma 0.01 4.00 0.0027 0.0002 0.0027 0.0024 0.0031
¾AT Inv Gamma 0.01 4.00 0.0225 0.0049 0.0256 0.0164 0.0344
¾AN Inv Gamma 0.01 4.00 0.0718 0.0204 0.0834 0.0456 0.1202
¾' Inv Gamma 0.01 4.00 0.0141 0.0032 0.0155 0.0100 0.0211
29Table 6: Parameter Estimates: Canada (Benchmark Case)
Canada
Prior Distribution Posterior Maximization Posterior Distribution
Parameters Distribution Mean Std Mode Std Error Mean 10% 90%
Ãd Beta 0.70 0.10 0.7107 0.0367 0.7175 0.6564 0.7828
Ãw Beta 0.70 0.10 0.7379 0.0358 0.7392 0.6804 0.7978
¿d Beta 0.50 0.15 0.2768 0.0688 0.2976 0.1841 0.4098
¿w Beta 0.50 0.15 0.2442 0.0819 0.2607 0.1279 0.3867
Á Beta 0.76 0.10 0.8121 0.0968 0.7796 0.6324 0.9307
Á
¤ Beta 0.30 0.10 0.2533 0.0922 0.2648 0.1254 0.4060
¾ Gamma 1.50 0.25 1.6387 0.2781 1.6926 1.2112 2.1424
¾f Gamma 1.50 0.25 1.8888 0.1412 1.8906 1.6610 2.1181
½r Beta 0.80 0.10 0.9330 0.0107 0.9346 0.9178 0.9509
®¼ Gamma 1.60 0.10 1.2550 0.0940 1.2736 1.1236 1.4261
®y Gamma 0.50 0.20 0.9104 0.2188 0.9810 0.6138 1.3420
®x Gamma 0.25 0.10 0.5809 0.1359 0.5925 0.3619 0.8197
's Gamma 0.45 0.20 0.3458 0.0307 0.3538 0.3035 0.4028
'n Gamma 0.01 0.005 0.0346 0.0070 0.0353 0.0239 0.0465
Â Gamma 10.0 2.00 17.121 2.3311 17.468 13.619 21.263
% Beta 0.40 0.10 0.5558 0.0630 0.5470 0.4423 0.6504
½p Beta 0.80 0.10 0.5433 0.0660 0.5593 0.4500 0.6675
½AT Beta 0.85 0.05 0.9839 0.0064 0.9805 0.9694 0.9922
½AN Beta 0.80 0.10 0.3523 0.0659 0.3449 0.2362 0.4489
½' Beta 0.80 0.10 0.7626 0.0797 0.7433 0.6150 0.8743
¾p Inv Gamma 0.01 4.00 0.0641 0.0131 0.0647 0.0441 0.0852
¾r Inv Gamma 0.01 4.00 0.0022 0.0001 0.0022 0.0020 0.0025
¾AT Inv Gamma 0.01 4.00 0.0217 0.0047 0.0242 0.0153 0.0327
¾AN Inv Gamma 0.01 4.00 0.0603 0.0179 0.0705 0.0343 0.1063
¾' Inv Gamma 0.01 4.00 0.0076 0.0014 0.0082 0.0058 0.0106
30Table 7: Parameter Estimates: New Zealand (Benchmark Case)
New Zealand
Prior Distribution Posterior Maximization Posterior Distribution
Parameters Distribution Mean Std Mode Std Error Mean 10% 90%
Ãd Beta 0.70 0.10 0.6878 0.0428 0.7000 0.6329 0.7721
Ãw Beta 0.70 0.10 0.7250 0.0493 0.7314 0.6506 0.8109
¿d Beta 0.50 0.15 0.4662 0.0836 0.4727 0.3385 0.6072
¿w Beta 0.50 0.15 0.2988 0.1157 0.3409 0.1410 0.5350
Á Beta 0.70 0.10 0.7403 0.1007 0.7227 0.5721 0.8766
Á
¤ Beta 0.30 0.10 0.2336 0.0880 0.2511 0.1160 0.3854
¾ Gamma 1.50 0.25 1.6328 0.2674 1.6986 1.2448 2.1314
¾f Gamma 1.50 0.25 2.0040 0.1747 2.0141 1.7436 2.2826
½r Beta 0.80 0.10 0.9304 0.0125 0.9303 0.9106 0.9508
®¼ Gamma 1.60 0.10 1.4858 0.0952 1.4958 1.3368 1.6535
®y Gamma 0.50 0.20 0.8649 0.2042 0.9024 0.5599 1.2298
®x Gamma 0.25 0.10 0.1381 0.0554 0.1590 0.0634 0.2498
's Gamma 0.45 0.20 0.4309 0.0381 0.4265 0.3752 0.4782
'n Gamma 0.01 0.005 0.0260 0.0052 0.0265 0.0177 0.0347
Â Gamma 10.0 2.00 15.346 2.2065 15.880 12.216 19.494
% Beta 0.40 0.10 0.5768 0.0575 0.5678 0.4690 0.6618
½p Beta 0.80 0.10 0.7520 0.1085 0.7392 0.5975 0.8854
½AT Beta 0.85 0.05 0.9494 0.0194 0.9393 0.9053 0.9745
½AN Beta 0.80 0.10 0.3073 0.0690 0.3010 0.1927 0.4079
½' Beta 0.80 0.10 0.7767 0.1028 0.7652 0.6208 0.9101
¾p Inv Gamma 0.01 4.00 0.1508 0.0310 0.1477 0.1005 0.1953
¾r Inv Gamma 0.01 4.00 0.0033 0.0003 0.0033 0.0029 0.0038
¾AT Inv Gamma 0.01 4.00 0.0361 0.0090 0.0425 0.0248 0.0590
¾AN Inv Gamma 0.01 4.00 0.0842 0.0255 0.1020 0.0517 0.1522
¾' Inv Gamma 0.01 4.00 0.0154 0.0036 0.0166 0.0108 0.0223
31Table 8: Parameter Estimates: United Kingdom (Benchmark Case)
United Kingdom
Prior Distribution Posterior Maximization Posterior Distribution
Parameters Distribution Mean Std Mode Std Error Mean 10% 90%
Ãd Beta 0.70 0.10 0.7239 0.0345 0.7446 0.6865 0.7986
Ãw Beta 0.70 0.10 0.7396 0.0380 0.7355 0.6729 0.7982
¿d Beta 0.50 0.15 0.2529 0.0620 0.2745 0.1726 0.3771
¿w Beta 0.50 0.15 0.1496 0.0648 0.1689 0.0633 0.2682
Á Beta 0.30 0.10 0.3358 0.1194 0.3502 0.1690 0.5303
Á
¤ Beta 0.40 0.10 0.2435 0.0662 0.2517 0.1469 0.3553
¾ Gamma 1.50 0.25 1.4729 0.2693 1.6615 1.1481 2.1858
¾f Gamma 1.50 0.25 2.3015 0.2023 2.3073 1.9828 2.6310
½r Beta 0.80 0.10 0.9443 0.0092 0.9439 0.9290 0.9593
®¼ Gamma 1.60 0.10 1.4162 0.0938 1.4401 1.2866 1.5965
®y Gamma 0.50 0.20 1.0989 0.2268 1.1503 0.7640 1.5188
®x Gamma 0.25 0.10 0.2137 0.0633 0.2266 0.1203 0.3322
's Gamma 0.45 0.20 0.2983 0.0308 0.3096 0.2569 0.3655
'n Gamma 0.01 0.005 0.0307 0.0076 0.0324 0.0203 0.0446
Â Gamma 10.0 2.00 18.035 2.5806 18.108 13.846 22.246
% Beta 0.40 0.10 0.8202 0.0315 0.8111 0.7580 0.8646
½p Beta 0.80 0.10 0.6228 0.0486 0.6325 0.5448 0.7231
½AT Beta 0.85 0.05 0.9817 0.0093 0.9661 0.9370 0.9928
½AN Beta 0.80 0.10 0.3507 0.0702 0.3307 0.2189 0.4418
½' Beta 0.80 0.10 0.8197 0.0668 0.7990 0.6890 0.9126
¾p Inv Gamma 0.01 4.00 0.0471 0.0090 0.0450 0.0320 0.0578
¾r Inv Gamma 0.01 4.00 0.0019 0.0001 0.0020 0.0017 0.0022
¾AT Inv Gamma 0.01 4.00 0.0340 0.0080 0.0459 0.0240 0.0685
¾AN Inv Gamma 0.01 4.00 0.0578 0.0178 0.0811 0.0375 0.1206
¾' Inv Gamma 0.01 4.00 0.0127 0.0025 0.0142 0.0098 0.0187
32Table 9: Parameter Estimates: New Zealand (®x = 0)
New Zealand
Prior Distribution Posterior Maximization Posterior Distribution
Parameters Distribution Mean Std Mode Std Error Mean 10% 90%
Ãd Beta 0.70 0.10 0.6897 0.0424 0.7028 0.6367 0.7725
Ãw Beta 0.70 0.10 0.7372 0.0483 0.7458 0.6679 0.8222
¿d Beta 0.50 0.15 0.4699 0.0850 0.4788 0.3387 0.6111
¿w Beta 0.50 0.15 0.3017 0.1183 0.3482 0.1464 0.5485
Á Beta 0.70 0.10 0.7414 0.1004 0.7218 0.5673 0.8742
Á
¤ Beta 0.30 0.10 0.2439 0.0909 0.2633 0.1237 0.4008
¾ Gamma 1.50 0.25 1.6280 0.2673 1.6930 1.2472 2.1366
¾f Gamma 1.50 0.25 1.9838 0.1712 1.9954 1.7283 2.2757
½r Beta 0.80 0.10 0.9285 0.0128 0.9274 0.9065 0.9480
®¼ Gamma 1.60 0.10 1.4763 0.0952 1.4820 1.3261 1.6349
®y Gamma 0.50 0.20 0.8231 0.1968 0.8418 0.5145 1.1542
's Gamma 0.45 0.20 0.4260 0.0394 0.4220 0.3702 0.4772
'n Gamma 0.01 0.005 0.0264 0.0053 0.0271 0.0185 0.0357
Â Gamma 10.0 2.00 15.067 2.1771 15.526 11.868 18.950
% Beta 0.40 0.10 0.5926 0.0562 0.5878 0.4933 0.6804
½p Beta 0.80 0.10 0.7371 0.1093 0.7253 0.5813 0.8751
½AT Beta 0.85 0.05 0.9520 0.0184 0.9420 0.9093 0.9758
½AN Beta 0.80 0.10 0.3131 0.0695 0.3070 0.1964 0.4141
½' Beta 0.80 0.10 0.7936 0.0946 0.7812 0.6482 0.9213
¾p Inv Gamma 0.01 4.00 0.1481 0.0311 0.1442 0.0965 0.1911
¾r Inv Gamma 0.01 4.00 0.0032 0.0003 0.0032 0.0028 0.0037
¾AT Inv Gamma 0.01 4.00 0.0365 0.0090 0.0433 0.0256 0.0615
¾AN Inv Gamma 0.01 4.00 0.0834 0.0248 0.1009 0.0523 0.1524
¾' Inv Gamma 0.01 4.00 0.0154 0.0036 0.0167 0.0109 0.0224
33Table 10: Log Marginal Likelihood Values
Country
Log Marginal Data Density Australia Canada United Kingdom New Zealand
Exogenous qt (®x ¢ ¢qt) 1219.3182 2324.0028 1594.3603 1075.0426
Exogenous qt (®x ¢ ¢st) 1218.0107 2316.8426 1595.3912 1071.8586
Exogenous qt (®x = 0) 1217.4712 2321.0081 1597.8804 1079.0370
Endogenous qt (®x ¢ ¢qt) 1261.0284 2325.9086 1659.2395 1120.2250
Endogenous qt (®x ¢ ¢st) 1252.5516 2320.4496 1643.8093 1120.9483
Endogenous qt (®x ¢ ¢rpt) 1248.7088 2310.5528 1651.9486 1119.8444
Endogenous qt (®x = 0) 1252.6941 2314.7133 1657.3496 1122.3534
Table 11: Bayes Factor and Posterior Odds
Country
Australia Canada United Kingdom New Zealand
Bayes Factor
Endogenous qt (®x ¢ ¢qt) 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Endogenous qt (®x ¢ ¢st) 0.0002 0.0043 0.0000 2.0612
Endogenous qt (®x ¢ ¢rpt) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.6835
Endogenous qt (®x = 0) 0.0002 0.0000 0.1511 8.4014
Posterior Odds
Endogenous qt (®x ¢ ¢qt) 2499.0 231.56 6.6161 0.0897
Endogenous qt (®x ¢ ¢st) 0.0002 0.0043 0.0000 0.2044
Endogenous qt (®x ¢ ¢rpt) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0597
Endogenous qt (®x = 0) 0.0002 0.0000 0.1510 2.2436
34Table 12: Variance Decompositions: Australia (Benchmark Case)
Australia
^ qt ^ yt ^ ¼t ^ rt
Tradable technology shock 1 22.467 3.1036 41.741 88.944
4 9.6759 7.6476 44.695 84.327
8 8.7875 8.4854 44.529 80.731
12 8.7492 9.5310 44.380 78.138
Non-tradable technology shock 1 0.3787 0.1919 42.271 0.0031
4 0.2852 8.4524 31.617 0.4638
8 0.2515 9.4378 31.456 0.4818
12 0.2591 9.3024 30.444 0.6278
Risk premium shock 1 22.654 26.226 0.1197 5.2198
4 9.1217 32.672 6.4224 6.4723
8 8.2607 31.525 6.8485 7.5662
12 8.1530 31.338 7.7268 8.3027
Monetary policy shock 1 0.0935 1.4956 0.0108 2.4559
4 0.0402 1.0726 0.0323 2.2955
8 0.0283 1.0235 0.0390 2.1533
12 0.0262 1.0062 0.0391 2.0586
Government spending shock 1 0.0000 3.7558 0.0064 0.0150
4 0.0003 2.6604 0.0049 0.0139
8 0.0004 2.5367 0.0049 0.0131
12 0.0004 2.4938 0.0047 0.0125
Foreign price shock 1 54.149 65.210 15.850 3.2480
4 80.765 47.318 17.125 6.2920
8 82.570 46.816 17.012 8.9159
12 82.711 46.152 17.288 10.718
Foreign interest rate shock 1 0.2469 0.0076 0.0001 0.1137
4 0.1025 0.1704 0.1034 0.1341
8 0.0944 0.1689 0.1088 0.1361
12 0.0947 0.1701 0.1148 0.1401
Foreign output shock 1 0.0108 0.0096 0.0009 0.0002
4 0.0088 0.0069 0.0010 0.0016
8 0.0070 0.0067 0.0018 0.0023
12 0.0066 0.0066 0.0020 0.0025
35Table 13: Variance Decompositions: Canada (Benchmark Case)
Canada
^ qt ^ yt ^ ¼t ^ rt
Tradable technology shock 1 5.1914 10.347 18.272 66.608
4 1.9933 4.7231 24.989 37.988
8 2.3273 5.4077 21.113 33.360
12 2.3440 5.7784 21.290 33.007
Non-tradable technology shock 1 0.3695 0.0342 58.139 0.0321
4 0.2658 1.6453 33.108 0.1370
8 0.2391 1.5716 27.087 0.1393
12 0.2411 1.5363 26.093 0.2186
Risk premium shock 1 3.6453 12.770 3.0656 0.7467
4 1.3200 6.1700 6.2706 0.8094
8 1.3806 5.1894 5.3194 1.1837
12 1.3829 5.1548 5.4396 1.3449
Monetary policy shock 1 0.0778 0.2504 0.1156 3.6382
4 0.0274 0.1095 0.1133 2.0518
8 0.0217 0.0887 0.0960 1.7346
12 0.0211 0.0866 0.0926 1.6975
Government spending shock 1 0.0000 1.1899 0.0189 0.0381
4 0.0006 0.4601 0.0121 0.0216
8 0.0007 0.3726 0.0101 0.0184
12 0.0007 0.3636 0.0097 0.0180
Foreign price shock 1 90.395 74.592 20.100 28.793
4 96.255 86.462 34.946 58.854
8 95.892 87.003 45.882 63.400
12 95.871 86.714 46.570 63.536
Foreign interest rate shock 1 0.2387 0.7616 0.1275 0.1436
4 0.0887 0.3884 0.4376 0.1106
8 0.0989 0.3306 0.3758 0.1354
12 0.1000 0.3312 0.3916 0.1501
Foreign output shock 1 0.0824 0.0544 0.1611 0.0001
4 0.0492 0.0412 0.1231 0.0282
8 0.0400 0.0363 0.1167 0.0284
12 0.0390 0.0356 0.1136 0.0285
36Table 14: Variance Decompositions: New Zealand (®x = 0)
New Zealand
^ qt ^ yt ^ ¼t ^ rt
Tradable technology shock 1 10.495 58.424 61.663 28.504
4 15.895 54.543 61.838 60.655
8 18.858 55.383 74.622 66.160
12 18.988 55.600 73.213 64.545
Non-tradable technology shock 1 0.3275 0.0001 4.8767 0.1892
4 0.2369 0.0406 3.3527 0.0908
8 0.2246 0.0438 1.6771 0.0838
12 0.2331 0.0449 1.3312 0.1064
Risk premium shock 1 2.1720 0.2871 0.1737 0.0024
4 0.7845 0.3166 0.3098 0.1347
8 1.0895 0.3569 0.2565 0.2991
12 1.1289 0.3718 0.2996 0.2888
Monetary policy shock 1 0.0380 0.0037 0.0043 0.8157
4 0.0135 0.0042 0.0081 0.3885
8 0.0111 0.0041 0.0051 0.1966
12 0.0110 0.0040 0.0040 0.1502
Government spending shock 1 0.0001 0.0368 0.0019 0.0058
4 0.0005 0.0338 0.0016 0.0027
8 0.0005 0.0327 0.0008 0.0014
12 0.0005 0.0325 0.0006 0.0011
Foreign price shock 1 86.961 41.245 33.280 70.483
4 83.065 45.058 34.489 38.726
8 79.809 44.175 23.436 33.255
12 79.631 43.943 25.148 34.904
Foreign interest rate shock 1 0.0040 0.0037 0.0001 0.0002
4 0.0026 0.0035 0.0002 0.0028
8 0.0054 0.0039 0.0022 0.0045
12 0.0058 0.0040 0.0031 0.0045
Foreign output shock 1 0.0032 0.0000 0.0002 0.0002
4 0.0023 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002
8 0.0020 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001
12 0.0020 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001
37Table 15: Variance Decompositions: United Kingdom (Benchmark Case)
United Kingdom
^ qt ^ yt ^ ¼t ^ rt
Tradable technology shock 1 6.3697 3.0971 44.256 74.589
4 2.3353 3.2202 40.084 70.704
8 2.1928 3.9360 39.847 69.969
12 2.1275 4.0505 39.799 69.757
Non-tradable technology shock 1 0.3859 0.0384 32.936 0.0246
4 0.3050 1.5747 26.641 0.2059
8 0.2615 1.7927 26.578 0.2253
12 0.2589 1.7938 26.516 0.3126
Risk premium shock 1 18.352 4.7439 0.3548 0.9746
4 6.4047 4.7234 2.9242 1.1440
8 5.6713 4.5550 3.0308 1.4761
12 5.5346 4.5597 3.2285 1.6716
Monetary policy shock 1 0.0790 0.1474 0.0053 1.8857
4 0.0261 0.1194 0.0154 1.7879
8 0.0194 0.1145 0.0175 1.7650
12 0.0185 0.1140 0.0183 1.7605
Government spending shock 1 0.0001 0.4970 0.0051 0.0129
4 0.0004 0.4007 0.0041 0.0122
8 0.0004 0.3844 0.0041 0.0121
12 0.0004 0.3826 0.0041 0.0120
Foreign price shock 1 74.644 91.442 22.439 22.506
4 90.863 89.927 30.309 26.137
8 91.798 89.184 30.499 26.541
12 92.005 89.066 30.408 26.473
Foreign interest rate shock 1 0.1336 0.0347 0.0027 0.0067
4 0.0466 0.0345 0.0212 0.0079
8 0.0411 0.0333 0.0219 0.0103
12 0.0401 0.0333 0.0233 0.0117
Foreign output shock 1 0.0355 0.0000 0.0010 0.0002
4 0.0194 0.0003 0.0014 0.0011
8 0.0151 0.0003 0.0017 0.0013
12 0.0145 0.0003 0.0017 0.0013
38Table 16: Log Marginal Likelihood Values: UK 92:4{06:4
Log Marginal Data Density United Kingdom
Endogenous qt (®x ¢ ¢qt) 964.9776
Endogenous qt (®x ¢ ¢st) 958.4531
Endogenous qt (®x ¢ ¢rpt) 958.4522
Endogenous qt (®x = 0) 961.4617
Table 17: Parameter Estimates: United Kingdom, 1992Q4{2006Q4
United Kingdom
Prior Distribution Posterior Maximization Posterior Distribution
Parameters Distribution Mean Std Mode Std Error Mean 10% 90%
Ãd Beta 0.70 0.10 0.6081 0.0535 0.6412 0.5441 0.7394
Ãw Beta 0.70 0.10 0.7756 0.0495 0.7707 0.6862 0.8577
¿d Beta 0.50 0.15 0.4727 0.0994 0.4867 0.3203 0.6539
¿w Beta 0.50 0.15 0.2613 0.1009 0.2828 0.1216 0.4371
Á Beta 0.30 0.10 0.3061 0.1115 0.3270 0.1559 0.4966
Á
¤ Beta 0.40 0.10 0.3224 0.0864 0.3350 0.1980 0.4692
¾ Gamma 1.50 0.25 1.5614 0.2616 1.6335 1.1812 2.0549
¾f Gamma 1.50 0.25 1.9874 0.1780 1.9955 1.7019 2.2797
½r Beta 0.80 0.10 0.9168 0.0158 0.9160 0.8888 0.9425
®¼ Gamma 1.60 0.10 1.5296 0.0960 1.5413 1.3804 1.7027
®y Gamma 0.50 0.20 0.9555 0.2390 0.9965 0.5770 1.3864
®x Gamma 0.25 0.10 0.1169 0.0455 0.1340 0.0549 0.2077
's Gamma 0.45 0.20 0.3696 0.0366 0.3723 0.3116 0.4349
'n Gamma 0.01 0.005 0.0250 0.0066 0.0269 0.0154 0.0379
Â Gamma 10.0 2.00 13.049 2.0516 13.544 10.151 17.009
% Beta 0.40 0.10 0.7765 0.0471 0.7475 0.6590 0.8351
½p Beta 0.80 0.10 0.6466 0.0760 0.6333 0.5015 0.7661
½AT Beta 0.85 0.05 0.9385 0.0253 0.9151 0.8649 0.9665
½AN Beta 0.80 0.10 0.4732 0.0802 0.4420 0.3078 0.5729
½' Beta 0.80 0.10 0.7721 0.0935 0.7510 0.6103 0.8940
¾p Inv Gamma 0.01 4.00 0.0487 0.0116 0.0458 0.0277 0.0624
¾r Inv Gamma 0.01 4.00 0.0014 0.0002 0.0015 0.0012 0.0017
¾AT Inv Gamma 0.01 4.00 0.0234 0.0060 0.0295 0.0162 0.0428
¾AN Inv Gamma 0.01 4.00 0.0201 0.0064 0.0296 0.0125 0.0493
¾' Inv Gamma 0.01 4.00 0.0098 0.0025 0.0111 0.0069 0.0154
39Table 18: Log Marginal Likelihood Values: Expected In°ation Targeting
Country
Log Marginal Data Density Australia Canada United Kingdom New Zealand
Endogenous qt (®x ¢ ¢qt) 1261.6177 2326.7813 1658.5019 1115.4667
Endogenous qt (®x ¢ ¢st) 1253.9685 2325.0873 1651.5374 1119.7415
Endogenous qt (®x ¢ ¢rpt) 1251.6252 2311.5038 1658.5931 1115.8417
Endogenous qt (®x = 0) 1255.6925 2316.3575 1651.9159 1118.5223
Table 19: Log Marginal Likelihood Values: Sectoral In°ation Targeting
Country
Log Marginal Data Density Australia Canada United Kingdom New Zealand
Endogenous qt (®x ¢ ¢qt) 1228.6918 2284.9469 1640.7986 1116.6667
Endogenous qt (®x ¢ ¢st) 1228.3615 2269.4721 1643.9991 1118.5154
Endogenous qt (®x ¢ ¢rpt) 1214.8495 2262.5347 1642.9832 1116.4205
Endogenous qt (®x = 0) 1221.8707 2242.7252 1638.2943 1119.7792
Table 20: Log Marginal Likelihood Values: Wage In°ation Targeting
Country
Log Marginal Data Density Australia Canada United Kingdom New Zealand
Endogenous qt (®x ¢ ¢qt) 1232.7349 2290.8191 1643.5816 1112.0690
Endogenous qt (®x ¢ ¢st) 1236.3383 2314.9504 1646.1704 1119.5378
Endogenous qt (®x ¢ ¢rpt) 1234.6392 2265.5657 1632.9093 1113.1133
Endogenous qt (®x = 0) 1228.8551 2285.1957 1638.9422 1113.6355
40Figure 1: Impulse Responses: Canada



































































































































































































































































































































41Figure 2: Impulse Responses: Canada
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